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Abstract:  Changes in volatility of output growth and inflation are examined for eight countries with at least 140 
years of uninterrupted data. Time-varying parameter vector autoregressions are used to estimate standard deviations 
of each variable. Both volatilities rise quickly with World War I and its aftermath, stay relatively high until the end of 
World War II, and then drop rapidly until the mid- to late 1960s. This Postwar Moderation typically yields the largest 
decline in output growth volatilities. For all countries, volatilities of both output growth and inflation fall more 
during this Postwar Moderation than during the Great Moderation, and often the difference is huge. Both volatilities 
typically reach their lowest levels following the Great Moderation. The Great Moderation often counteracts an 
increase in volatility that took place in the 1970s, particularly for inflation. In nearly all the countries in our sample, 
the recent financial crisis has eliminated the stability gains associated with the Great Moderation, and sometimes it 
has even eroded gains made during the Postwar Moderation. Periods in which a fixed exchange rate system was 
widespread are associated with relatively low volatilities for both variables. Based on our structural VAR 
identification, permanent shocks to output account for nearly all of the fluctuations in the volatility of output growth 
while shocks that have only a temporary effect on output explain most of the fluctuations in inflation volatility. These 
last two findings suggest that changes in the volatility for each variable are primarily driven by a fundamentally 
different type of disturbance. 
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1.  Introduction   
  A considerable amount of evidence reveals that economic activity is not well-
characterized by constant volatility. Empirical research has found a substantial decline in the 
volatility of macroeconomic aggregates beginning perhaps as early as the late 1970s. This period 
is identified as the Great Moderation, and a large literature has developed to understand this 
event.1 Many empirical studies have focused exclusively on the United States.2
Our first question is: how have these volatilities behaved over time? Given the finding 
that both variables experience substantial fluctuation in volatility, with particularly large 
movements in inflation volatility, we next ask: do these patterns of variation share any 
similarities across different economies? A remarkable number of patterns are found to be robust 
across countries. These robust tendencies raise the question: are observed movements in 
volatility associated with changes in policy or with non-policy events?  
 Most 
investigations consider only the post-World War II experience. This paper investigates a 
number of important questions about the volatilities of output growth and inflation for eight 
countries that have 140 years or more of uninterrupted annual source data. 
  To address these questions, we use recently developed techniques for vector 
autoregression (VAR) modeling that allow for time-varying parameters. Our specification 
permits the coefficients to potentially change at each point in time, and it also provides for 
possible stochastic volatility in the errors. We use this model to estimate volatilities for real 
output growth and inflation for each country found to have relatively lengthy time series.3
                                                           
1 See McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Stock and Watson (2002), Davis and Khan (2008), and Inoue 
and Rossi (2011) among many. 
 
2 Exceptions include Summers (2005), who examines the G7 countries, and Cecchetti et al. (2005), who conclude that a Great 
Moderation in the mid-1980s can be found in many OECD countries. 
3 It seems particularly reasonable to allow shock variances and coefficients in the model to change when studying an economy over 
a long period of time. 3 
 
  Our study is motivated, in part, by the common wisdom that the Great Moderation is an 
unprecedented event. In contrast to that view, we present evidence of other periods in which 
even greater moderations have occurred. Following World War II, the volatilities of output 
growth and inflation in all of the countries we consider fell more than they did during the Great 
Moderation—and in most cases the difference is substantial. This period has been labeled the 
Postwar Moderation.4
Another more immediate concern is whether the recent financial crisis has cut into 
stability gains achieved during the two preceding moderations. In most cases, volatilities are 
now higher than the lowest levels reached during the Postwar Moderation. Hence, the stability 
gains from the Great Moderation have been completely eroded for most of the countries in this 
study. While this finding does not mean policymakers are incapable of bringing the economy 
back to a relative stable state, our evidence suggests many countries now face a long road to 
achieving the low volatilities found previously. 
 Our evidence suggests that the Postwar Moderation is not merely a 
return to normal pre-World War II volatilities, but the beginning of a period in which 
volatilities are persistently lower than before. In a number of cases, much of the improvement 
associated with the Great Moderation is a reversal of the rise in volatility that occurred during 
the 1970s, particularly for inflation. We also find that volatilities of output growth and inflation 
are relatively low during the Classical Gold Standard period (1880-1914). Excluding this period, 
volatilities are almost always lower after the Postwar Moderation than in the sample period 
before World War II. This evidence of other moderations provides a better understanding of the 
scale and the significance of the so-called Great Moderation. 
                                                           
4 While different authors have used the term “Postwar Moderation” to mean various things, Keating and Valcarcel (2012) use that 
term to refer specifically to the period from shortly after World War II until the mid-1960s. 4 
 
It would be of particular interest to determine what structural factors are behind these 
robust cross-country patterns in volatilities. One approach is to identify structural shocks from 
the reduced-form and use these shocks to interpret the data. Clearly this road is subject to a host 
of well-known difficulties.5 While there is no generally accepted framework for performing 
investigations of this nature, perhaps the most widely used identification scheme in the 
literature comes from Blanchard and Quah (1989) — henceforth BQ— who decompose output 
into permanent and transitory shocks. If their identifying assumptions are structurally valid, the 
permanent shock to output is an aggregate supply (real) shock and the transitory shock is an 
aggregate demand (nominal) shock.6
In contrast to BQ, and most of the literature that builds on their work, we identify the 
permanent and transitory shocks using a time-varying VAR model. We find that changes in 
volatility for output growth are primarily associated with the permanent shocks to output and 
that most changes in inflation volatility are associated with shocks that have only a temporary 
effect on output. 
   
While most volatility studies have omitted data from earlier periods, we are not the first 
to examine changes in volatility from a historical perspective.7
                                                           
5 See Kilian (2012) for a useful  overview of many crucial issues in the context of the literature.  
 Previous research has examined 
the evidence from long time series by assuming volatilities were constant over arbitrary 
subsamples. An important distinguishing feature of our paper, relative to the previous 
literature, is that we econometrically estimate when and how volatilities have changed. We do 
6 While popular, the Blanchard and Quah (1989) approach is subject to a number of potential concerns one should be aware of. Faust 
and Leeper (1997) point out that each identified shock should be viewed as an aggregate of multiple underlying shocks. They argue 
that the Blanchard and Quah (1989) scheme is only valid if the macroeconomic variables in question respond to each type of a 
particular structural shock in the same way qualitatively. In other words, all types of disturbance to aggregate supply must affect 
output growth and the unemployment rate in qualitatively the same way, and all types of disturbance to aggregate demand must 
affect the two variables in qualitatively the same way. In other work, Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) study how well the Blanchard 
and Quah decomposition identifies technology shocks by performing a Monte Carlo investigation of calibrated structural models. 
They find that this decomposition performs well but does so under conditions even more restrictive than are implied by the 
identification assumptions. 
7 For example, Romer (1999), and more recently, Nason and Smith (2008) have considered evidence from subsamples including 
periods prior to World War I. 5 
 
not presuppose dates of change in volatilities but instead allow the data to speak for itself on 
this issue. Another advantage of our model, when compared with a more traditional fixed-
parameter approach, is that it allows us to determine whether a period of moderation takes 
place gradually or rapidly. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 constructs the time-varying parameter 
model, specifies the identification strategy, and describes the analysis of second moments. 
Section 3 discusses data sources and methods. Section 4 describes our results on time-variation 
in the volatilities of output growth and inflation. Section 5 examines the role of permanent and 
transitory shocks to output in explaining movements in volatilities over time. We conclude by 
discussing our main empirical findings and by examining the implications of these results for 
the sources of variation in volatilities of output growth and inflation. 
 
2.  The Time-Varying VAR and the Decomposition of Permanent and Transitory Shocks 
We model the time series using a VAR that allows for time variation in the 
autoregressive coefficients and shock covariance matrix. This framework does not require any a 
priori assumptions about timing, frequency, or magnitude of possible changes in parameters. 
An important advantage of this approach is that it allows us to estimate a model that combines 
data from periods in which an economy behaved quite differently. At one time it was common 
for economists to estimate fixed parameter models using sample periods that excluded 
interesting, but potentially extreme, events such as World War I, the Great Depression, and 
World War II. Many believed the economy operated in a fundamentally different way during 
periods of global warfare or world-wide depression and, thus, the parameters were assumed to 
take on different values. A time-varying parameter model allows us to include these unusual 6 
 
periods of time in the estimation and to formally address the hypothesis that the parameters are 
different.  
Our approach is similar to those of Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), Primiceri (2005), 
and Galí and Gambetti (2009). Consider an l -th order VAR process  
  θ = () ttt Lx e    (2.1) 
wherext is an n-vector of endogenous variables determined at time t, each θjt  in 
θ θθ =− −− 1 ( ) ... l
t t lt LI L L  is a matrix of time-varying coefficients, and  t e is an n-vector of 
mean-zero VAR innovations with the time-varying covariance matrix t R . The coefficients in 
(2.1) evolve according to8
 
  
1 tt t u θθ − = +   (2.2) 
where the vector  t θ  stacks all parameters in  () t L θ , and  t u  is Gaussian white noise with zero 
mean and constant covariance matrix Q, independent of  t e at all leads and lags.9
= 0 t u
 The model 
reduces to a VAR with fixed coefficients and stochastic volatility if  for all t. For 
convenience, we omit means from this exposition, but for estimation we allow the means to be 
time-varying following a process analogous to the autoregressive parameters in (2.2). We use a 
variant of the Jaquier et al. (1994) stochastic volatility framework that decomposes the 
covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR as follows: 
    () t t tt Eee R FHF   where F is given by 
2,1,
,1, , 1,
1   0      0
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8  This is a parameterization of a more general law of motion ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 |, |,
tt t tt p QI f Q θθ θ θθ
−− ∝ for the posterior densities of the 
states where ( ) θt I is an indicator function that carries out the rejection sampling mechanism necessary to rule out explosive paths 
of x. 
9 According to Primiceri (2005), this assumption is not necessary, but it allows for more efficient computations. 7 
 
  The diagonal elements of  t H  are independent univariate stochastic processes that evolve 
according to the following: 
  , ,1 ln ln 1,2, jt jt t hh j n        (2.3) 
where  (0, ) t iid   . This random walk specification allows us to focus on permanent shifts in 
the innovation variance—such as those emphasized in the US economic stabilization literature 
(Cogley and Sargent 2005)—while reducing the dimensionality of the estimation procedure 
(Primiceri 2005).10
  We stack all the off-diagonal elements of 
  
1
t F  into a vector t  and, following Primiceri 
(2005), we assume that this vector evolves according to the following drift-less random walk 
  1 tt t       (2.4) 
where (0, ) t iid   . All innovations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, and our 















                                                     
where each vector of shocks ( ,,, tttt u  ) consists of two elements;  t   is a vector of uncorrelated 
structural shocks with unit variance; Q ,, and  are positive definite 2x2 matrices; I is a 2x2 
identity matrix; and 0 is a 2x2 matrix of zeros. None of the off-diagonal zero restrictions are 
required for estimation.11
                                                           
10 This presents an alternative to ARCH models where the variances are generated by an unobserved components (UC) approach.   
 However, allowing for an entirely unrestricted correlation structure 
among the different sources of uncertainty would negate any structural interpretation of the 
innovations. 
11 Primiceri (2005) outlines a minor modification to the estimation scheme to allow for non-zero off-diagonal blocks. 8 
 
  Following Galí and Gambetti (2009), we assume that the innovations, t e , of reduced–
form system (2.1) are a time-varying transformation of thet structural shocks satisfying 
() tt EI    . Thus, we have the following: 
  t tt et     (2.5) 
where  t   is a nonsingular matrix that satisfies  tt t R   . Given this normalization scheme, 
changes in the contributions of different structural shocks to the volatility in innovations to the 
variables are captured by changes in t  . 
            The identification of shocks has nothing to do with the unconditional volatilities, which 
will be a major focus of the discussion that follows. These volatilities can be derived directly 
from the reduced form and do not depend on the identification of permanent and transitory 
shocks to the level of output. Conditional volatilities are the only ones that depend on these 
shocks. 
Let the companion form of (2.1) be given by 
  1 t tt t x x De      (2.6) 
where  − −+ ′′ ′ ′ =  11 ( , ,..., ) t tt t x xx x ,   ′ = ( ,0,...,0) DI  , both of these matrices have the same 
dimensions, and t  is the companion-form matrix derived from the autoregressive coefficients 
in (2.1). A standard local projection of (2.6) yields 
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
  (2.7) 
where  2,2() s   is the appropriate selector function.12
                                                           
12 Technically, the selector function is given by 
  Application of the chain rule yields the 
following impulse responses at an arbitrary k-th horizon: 
2,2() kk
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 
  (2.8) 
  Our model is based on t y , the logarithm of real output, and t p , the logarithm of the price 
level, and both variables are first differenced:  ( )
′ ∆∆ = t tt x yp . For purposes of identifying shocks 
in the BQ decomposition, effects on the long-run level ofy are of interest. This requires 






    . The 
level response of each variable to each shock after k periods is the accumulated response of the 
differenced series from period zero to period k. Following equation (2.8), the accumulated 









  . Finally, from the properties of the 
selector function, we obtain
  , 2,2() k
tk t t Ms  . Furthermore, letting k allows us to define 
2,2() t tt Ms    as a time-varying matrix of cumulative multipliers that measure the long-run 
effect of each shock on output and the price level.  
  The underlying structural shocks,   
PT
t tt     , are identified by assuming a transitory 
shock does not affect the output level in the long run, in addition to the prior assumption that 
permanent shocks are uncorrelated with transitory shocks. This implies that our matrix of 
cumulative long-run multipliers is of a lower triangular form. Thus, from the definition of  t M  
  2,2 2,2 () [ () ] tt t t t MM s Rs    
 .  
  (2.9) 
t M is obtained as the Cholesky factor of the right-hand side of (2.9). Given t M , we can solve for
t   as a function of the parameters in the VAR and obtain the structural impulse responses of 









s s M tk

           
   
With the exception of the long-run output response to a transitory output shock, every response 
of each variable to each disturbance may evolve over time. 
  Note that t M is calculated in essentially the same way as BQ, except for two important 
differences: We allow for time variation in the coefficients and the covariance matrix of 
residuals, and we use the inflation rate as the second variable in the model, in contrast to BQ, 
who used the unemployment rate. 
Recursive substitution on (2.6) allows each variable to be written as a function of current 
and past values of the permanent and transitory shocks to output. And letting  it x represent 
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        (2.10) 
where , 2,2() k
tk t t Ns    .  From (2.11) we determine how the time-varying unconditional variance 
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x s s for i y p 


         (2.11) 
It is important to reemphasize that while this permanent-transitory shock decomposition serves 
as a means of identifying orthogonal shocks that may have structural interpretations, this 






3.  Data and Sources   
We selected countries with uninterrupted annual time series of real output growth and 
inflation going back well into the 19th century.13
A primary advantage of using a relatively long data sample is that it allows us to 
examine how economies have evolved under extremely different conditions. Volatilities are 
unlikely to remain constant as countries transition through the 19th century, the Great 
Depression, and the post-World War II period with intervening episodes of world-wide 
warfare. But, importantly, we do not constrain volatilities to be constant for arbitrary 
subsamples. The requirement of long uninterrupted annual time series does, however, limit our 
study to eight countries - the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Finland, 
Denmark, Canada, and Australia. Most of the other countries in the world do not provide 
reliable series of comparable length. Some countries have data of similar quality and length but 
have breaks in the series, typically around a world war (e.g., France, Germany, and Japan).  
 In almost all cases, these series were computed 
on the basis of aggregate output measured in nominal and real terms. Canada’s 1870 to 1960 
period is the only exception, where we construct real output from nominal GDP and the GDP 
deflator.  
Table 1 describes in detail the data used in our analysis. In all cases, we spliced output 
growth and inflation rates obtained from different sources. The table contains details on the 
various measures (GNP or GDP; chain-weighted or fixed base year measures of real output), 
data sources, splice dates, and base years (for calculating either a fixed weight measure of real 
output or the level of real output from chained growth rates). It is important to point out that 
despite various differences in data, our major results are robust across all, or nearly all, eight 
countries. 
                                                           
13 Backus and Kehoe (1992) used many of the same countries and frequently the same sources for historical output series in their 
multi-country investigation of how business cycle properties have changed over time. 12 
 
We estimate the model for the United States using Romer’s (1989) data. However, 
strikingly similar results for the United States have been obtained by Keating and Valcarcel 
(2012) using data from Mitchell (2003b) and by Keating and Valcarcel (2011) using Balke and 
Gordon (1989) data.14
Another advantage of US data is that we have higher quality NIPA series going back to 
1929, whereas for the other countries we have higher quality World Bank data that only goes 
back to around 1960. This raises a concern that the relatively limited span of high-quality data 
may play some role in generating results for the other seven countries. Obviously, we cannot 
directly address this concern because of data limitations. But we can determine if the US results 
are somehow affected if we perform our analysis with Mitchell’s US data from 1822 to 1960 
spliced to NIPA data from 1960 to 2009. The idea is to treat the US like the other countries by 
splicing its historical series of lower quality (Mitchell 2003b) to its modern series at roughly the 
same time as we spliced for those other countries. This procedure yields results that are 
virtually indistinguishable from the United States results reported here and in Keating and 
Valcarcel (2011, 2012).
 One advantage of studying the United States is that alternative sets of 
data are available with which to compare estimates. A second advantage is that the Romer 
(1989) and Balke and Gordon (1989) series improve upon the original US time series for pre-
1930 period. Unfortunately, little progress has been made on similar data improvements for 
other countries.  
15
                                                           
14 It has been suggested by Romer (1986) and others that the volatility reduction in output growth during the 1940s could be due to 
measurement error. In a related paper, Romer (1989) constructs a GNP series from pre-1909 data on commodity output. She finds 
that the interwar period stands out as a time of "immoderation" flanked by periods of similar volatility in output growth. On the 
contrary, Balke and Gordon (1989) do not obtain this same result with their data. Also, Sheffrin (1988) finds that data from five of 
the six European countries in his study (Sweden being the exception) support Romer’s claim that real output volatilities are 
essentially the same for the period before World War I and the period after World War II. But his approach is similar to previous 
researchers in that he calculated volatilities using preselected fixed sample periods, again in contrast to our approach. 
 Thus, our experiments show that the use of various sources of pre-1930 
15 Furthermore, we estimated the model for the US based on Mitchell data from 1822 to 1993 (which is the last observation in the 
2003 edition of Mitchell) spliced with NIPA data from 1993 to 2009. Our results from this experiment were quantitatively robust to 
all other US estimates. All of these efforts employ annual data, and, in the face of such robustness, some might still argue that this 
preponderance of similar estimates could be an artifice of the frequency of observation in the time series. Data limitations make it 13 
 
data and the use of different sample periods have no effect on US results. These experiments 
support the view that findings for the other seven countries would not change appreciably if 
better historical measures of real output and price levels were available.16
Each series for each country is plotted in the Appendix. Henceforth, all references to 
output pertain to the real measure of output unless stated otherwise.  
 We conclude that the 
robustness of results to different samples of historical United States series and to series from 
seven other countries is inconsistent with the hypothesis that our results stem from noisy data. 
 
4.  Evidence on Time-Varying Volatilities 
Figure 1 reports time-varying standard deviations of output growth and inflation for the 
United States, while Figures 2 through 8 report both standard deviations for the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Finland, Denmark, Canada, and Australia, respectively. Solid lines 
represent volatilities of output growth, while dashed lines denote inflation volatilities.  
4.1 Output Growth Volatilities 
We initially focus on the United States because the literature has paid a great deal of 
attention to US volatilities.17
                                                                                                                                                                                           
impossible to address this concern for every one of our results. But, based on monthly US data, graphs in Ahmadi (2009) show 
sizable reductions in volatility for industrial production and particularly for inflation taking place from the end of World War II 
until the mid-1960s. Thus the Postwar Moderation would seem robust, at least for the US, to higher frequency data. Note that the 
Postwar Moderation is not discussed in Ahmadi’s paper and that he uses a different econometric model for other ends to those of 
this paper. 
 We then turn to results for the other seven countries to determine 
whether US findings are exceptional or generally the same. Output volatility for the United 
States starts out relatively low prior to World War I. However, it is virtually always higher from 
the beginning of World War I to shortly after the Korean War than in any other period in the 
16 Also, the well-known problems with historical US data may be less important for the European countries in our study. Sheffrin 
(1988) explains how “methods used to construct data in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and Italy do(es) not reveal the type 
of fundamental change in methods that afflict United States’ estimates.” He also argues that there is “generally better source 
material in the European countries” compared to the United States. 
17 It helps clarify our main findings by first focusing attention on a single country, and the US is the largest economy for most of the 
period covered in this study. 14 
 
sample.  Then, we observe the Postwar Moderation as output volatility begins to fall 
dramatically from shortly after World War II until the mid-1960s. 
Table 2 provides a useful summary of some of the main results in this paper. It reports 
posterior standard deviation estimates at key points in time. Most importantly, this table 
facilitates a direct comparison of volatilities from the Postwar Moderation with those from the 
Great Moderation. Table 2 also shows the maximum and minimum values of each variable’s 
volatility in the sample, along with the year in which each of those occurred. The Postwar 
Moderation is measured by the percentage decline in standard deviation from 1947 to 1965. 
Volatilities in 1983 and 1995 are used to measure the extent of the Great Moderation. During 
this Postwar Moderation, the standard deviation of US output growth fell by almost 60%. 
Volatility stabilized for some time, and then, in the early 1980s, it began falling again, reaching 
its global minimum in 1997. This most recent decline is known as the Great Moderation, during 
which output growth volatility fell by 36%. This decline in volatility pales in comparison to that 
which occurred during the Postwar Moderation.18
When considering the other seven countries, Figures 2-8 indicate that, in general, output 
growth volatility declines rapidly almost immediately after World War II. In all cases, the 
decline in volatilities during this Postwar Moderation exceeds that of the Great Moderation, 
whether measured in terms of change in volatility or in percentage change. In fact, as illustrated 
by the figures, the Postwar Moderation clearly yields the largest decline in volatility in output 
volatility for six of the eight countries in our study. As indicated in Table 2, these reductions in 
volatility from 1947 and 1965 range from 85% in Italy to 49% in Denmark. For the remaining 
 At the end of the sample period, output 
growth volatility rises back to the level it had shortly before the Great Moderation. 
                                                           
18 Our estimate of the reduction in US output growth volatility during Great Moderation is in the ballpark of Stock and Watson’s 
(2002) estimate. 15 
 
two countries, Finland and Sweden, the largest decline in output growth volatility occurs after 
World War I. However, the second largest reduction in output growth volatility for these 
countries begins shortly after World War II.19
Output growth volatility tends to be persistently lower following the Postwar 
Moderation. It is always lower for the United States, Australia, and Canada and nearly always 
lower for the United Kingdom. Over most of the sample, output volatilities for Sweden, Italy, 
and Finland are lower in the post-World War II period than in the period before that war. 
Denmark is the exception, with unusually low output growth volatility for most of our pre-
World War I sample. 
 
  The moderations in output volatility that follow World War II are impressive for two 
reasons. One is that this period typically yields the most substantial decline in volatility for a 
country, and, if not largest, the Postwar Moderation is second largest. Regardless, the Postwar 
Moderation is in all cases more substantial than the Great Moderation. Second, the output 
growth volatility achieved by the end of this moderation is relatively low for the period up to 
that point in a sample.   
While output growth volatility tends to be lower following the Postwar Moderation than 
in the period which precedes it, this is not always the case. The primary exception is the 
Classical Gold Standard period. Output growth volatility is unusually low for Italy, Sweden, 
and Denmark during that period. But, if we exclude the Classical Gold Standard period for each 
country, output growth volatility is almost always lower following the rapid post-World War II 
decline than for any time before the Postwar Moderation.  
                                                           
19 Output volatility in Finland and Sweden reached an all-time peak (0.1 and 0.055, respectively) in 1918. Both countries experienced 
a reduction of 58% and 52% in output volatility after World War I that surpassed their Postwar Moderations—of 50% and 17%, 
respectively. These are the only two countries in our sample for which the Postwar Moderation was not the largest reduction in 
output growth volatility, but in both cases the Postwar Moderation was second largest. 16 
 
Output growth volatility almost always reaches its lowest level following the Great 
Moderation. There are, however, a few episodes after the Postwar Moderation has ended when 
output growth volatility increases. One example of this is the experience of most countries 
during the 1970s or early 1980s. This is particularly noteworthy for the United Kingdom where 
output growth volatility sometimes exceeds levels typical of the pre-World War II period. 
Another example of relatively high postwar volatilities comes from Finland and 
Sweden, which both experienced sizable increases in output growth volatility in the early 1990s. 
That period coincides with the Scandinavian financial crisis that primarily affected these two 
countries along with Norway. This crisis was associated with a boom in lending, which 
apparently caused a bubble in real estate and other asset markets. To make matters worse, the 
decline in asset prices was accompanied by a currency crisis. This crisis explains why output 
growth volatilities for these two countries were increasing while the other six countries in our 
study experienced a moderation in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Table 2). 
One of the most interesting findings is that output growth volatility for most countries is 
rising and relatively high at the end of our sample period. In all but one of them, output growth 
volatility has risen to a level not witnessed since the Great Moderation began. And for Sweden, 
Finland, and Denmark, volatility has reached levels not observed since much earlier in the 
postwar period. Australia is unique in that output growth volatility is not rising at the end of 
the sample period. This finding suggests the Australian economy has been mildly affected by 
the recent world-wide financial crisis, compared with the other seven countries.  
4.2 Inflation Volatilities 
Inflation volatilities are also reported in Figures 1 through 8 and in Table 2. First, we 
observe that US inflation volatility starts at a low level in the early 1900s that will not be reached 17 
 
again until after World War II. Volatility increases somewhat about the time of the Panic of 
1907, but then rises much faster during World War I. It reaches the highest in-sample level in 
1922, a few years after the war ends. Following a smaller post-World War II spike, inflation 
volatility falls more in percentage terms than in any other period. The steepest decline in 
inflation volatility occurs shortly after the 1951 Accord between the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve, which terminated the Fed’s obligation to peg the long-term nominal bond rate at a low 
level.20 By the mid-1960s inflation volatility falls by roughly 80% and, thus, experiences a 
Postwar Moderation that coincides with that of output growth volatility. But, subsequently, 
inflation volatility starts to rise, slowly at first, and more rapidly as it spikes in the mid-1970s. 
Volatility stays relatively high until the early 1980s, and then it begins to fall until the 1990s 
when it reaches its lowest in-sample level.21
  Adding the other seven countries to our discussion of inflation volatility yields a 
number of robust results, many of which are strikingly similar to those for output growth 
volatility. For example, the lowest inflation volatility prior to the end of World War II occurs 
during the Classical Gold Standard period. Immediately after World War II, inflation volatility 
rises for a period of time, and sometimes the increase is quite substantial; but eventually it 
begins to fall rapidly. Each country experiences a substantial moderation in inflation volatility 
after World War II, which takes place for a decade or more. The US, UK, Sweden, Italy, Finland, 
Denmark, Canada, and Australia experience a reduction in volatility of 80%, 68%, 49%, 89%, 
 Since then, it has increased a small amount and lies 
in the narrow range between the all-time low from the 1990s and the relatively low level 
reached in the mid-1960s. Thus, inflation volatility does not rise at the end of the sample, in 
contrast to output growth volatility. 
                                                           
20 The finding from the rational expectations literature that an arbitrary peg of the nominal interest rate gives rise to indeterminacy 
of the price level, details of which are carefully explained in Woodford (2003), is consistent with our result that inflation volatility 
comes down rapidly when the peg is lifted. 
21 US inflation volatility reduces by 66% between 1983 and 1995 to an eventual all-time low of 0.0070 by 1997. 18 
 
76%, 51%, 77%, and 35%, respectively, from 1947 to 1965.22 During this Postwar Moderation, the 
largest single-year decline for a country occurs somewhere between 1952 and 1955, not long 
after the Fed-Treasury accord of 1951. By the 1960s, inflation volatility reaches its lowest level 
up to that point in the sample period for all but one of the countries.23
  Inflation volatility has a strong tendency to be lower in the postwar period. But there are 
a few notable exceptions. For example, during the 1970s, inflation volatility for the UK, Sweden, 
Italy, Finland, Canada, and Australia often exceeds levels reached prior to the Postwar 
Moderation. It is during this period that the postwar highs for inflation volatility sometimes 
exceed the prewar lows experienced during the Classical Gold Standard period. Another 
exception to low postwar inflation volatility is the increase at the end of our sample. This occurs 
for every country—except, once again, in Australia—and is concurrent with the recent global 
financial crisis. The end-of-sample rise in inflation volatility is particularly pronounced for the 
UK, Denmark, and Canada. 
 Table 2 shows that 
inflation volatility falls during the Great Moderation, but by less than the Postwar 
Moderation—often by much less.  
In general, inflation volatility rises to a local, if not a global, maximum around the time 
of major wars. It spikes for all countries near the end of World War I, often reaching the highest 
level for a country.24
                                                           
22 The inflation volatility for the US, UK, Italy, and Denmark begins this postwar decline in 1946 or 1947, while it does not fall for 
Sweden, Finland, Canada, and Australia until the early 1950s. For each of the latter four countries, the percentage decline for 
inflation volatility in the Postwar Moderation would be larger if measured from the early 1950s peak in inflation volatility. 
 Inflation volatility also tends to elevate during and after World War II, 
most notably in Italy and Denmark, each of which experiences an all-time peak during that 
period.  
23 Finland, which had particularly low inflation volatility during the Classical Gold Standard period, is the exception. 
24 The maximum US inflation volatility in this paper occurs shortly after World War I. In contrast, Keating and Valcarcel (2012) find 
that this peak in inflation volatility is second to an all-time US peak that occurs during the Civil War. They used data from Mitchell 
(2003b) that provides much longer time series than the Romer (1989) data used in this paper. 19 
 
We find that a large and rapid reduction in inflation volatility typically follows the 
upward spike that almost always accompanies a major war. Often the largest decline occurs in 
the early 1920s. This seems to be an opposite reaction to the enormous rise in inflation volatility 
associated with World War I and its aftermath. And, while inflation volatility declines rapidly 
at that point, it does not reach the low levels typical of the postwar period or the Classical Gold 
Standard period. 
 
5.  Accounting for Changes in Volatility of Output Growth and Inflation 
Equation (2.11) is used to decompose the standard errors into components attributable 
to permanent and transitory shocks following a BQ-type identification scheme. That construct 
may provide a structural interpretation of the sources of changes in volatilities. If BQ's 
assumptions characterize the actual structure, their model associates permanent output shocks 
with aggregate supply and temporary output shocks with aggregate demand. This accounting 
for volatilities yields highly robust results across the eight countries.  
Figure 9 illustrates how output growth volatility is decomposed into components 
associated with these shocks to output at each point in time for each country. The contribution 
from temporary shocks to the volatility of output growth never exceeds, and almost never 
comes close to, the contribution made by permanent shocks. We observe only a few cases 
(around World War I, World War II, and the mid-1970s to the early 1980s) when temporary 
shocks make a notable contribution to output growth volatility. Overall, the most striking 
feature in these graphs is how movements in output volatility are closely mirrored by changes 
in the contribution from permanent shocks. Most of the time, permanent shocks account for 
nearly all of the volatility of output growth. These results, interpreted in the context of BQ’s 20 
 
model, imply that fluctuations in the contribution from aggregate supply are the primary factor 
explaining changes in output growth volatility.  
Figure 10 displays each country's inflation volatility at each point in time along with the 
contribution from each shock. For all countries, we see that the fluctuations in inflation 
volatility are usually closely tracked by the contribution made by temporary shocks to output. 
However, there are periods for some of the countries in which the permanent shock accounts 
for nearly as much inflation volatility as the temporary shock, and sometimes for even more, 
though this is rare. These exceptions occur primarily during world wars, the period from the 
mid-1970s to early 1980s, and the latter part of the sample. However, for most years, the 
temporary shock accounts for nearly all of the inflation volatility. The BQ model implies that 
aggregate demand is the major force behind changes in inflation volatility, although there are 
some periods when aggregate supply was also important.  
  Ignoring the 1970s and the Classical Gold Standard period, inflation volatility strongly 
tends to be lower after the Postwar Moderation than during the preceding period. The BQ 
model suggests that this relatively lower inflation volatility stems largely from a reduction in 
the contribution from aggregate demand. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
Many patterns of change in the volatilities of output growth and inflation are 
remarkably robust to all, or nearly all, the countries in our study. We find that volatilities rise 
quickly with World War I, stay relatively high until after World War II, and drop rapidly until 
the mid-to late 1960s. Volatilities show a very strong tendency to be lower following the 
Postwar Moderation compared with the whole period that precedes World War II. This finding 
suggests the greater emphasis on stabilization policy in the postwar period has yielded some 21 
 
success. For example, at the Bretton Woods meetings in July of 1944, a world-wide system of 
fixed exchange rates was established,25
The lowest volatilities at the end of the Postwar Moderation are typically larger than the 
lows achieved following the Great Moderation, though they are sometimes very close in 
magnitude. But the absolute reduction and the percentage decline for both volatilities during 
the Postwar Moderation exceeds that of the Great Moderation, and often does so by a huge 
margin.  
 and policy was oriented more towards stabilizing 
economic fluctuations. Subsequently, the United States passed the Employment Act of 1946, 
which occurs just before US volatilities of output growth and inflation began rapid descents. 
That timing suggests the intent of the US Federal government “to promote maximum 
employment, production and purchasing power” (15 USC, §1021) led to policies that made 
important contributions to the Postwar Moderation.   
Table 2 highlights a number of important points, in addition to the finding that the 
decline of both volatilities during the Postwar Moderation is uniformly greater than the Great 
Moderation. First, not every country experiences a Great Moderation. Sweden and Finland 
experienced an increase in volatilities between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s because of the 
Scandinavian financial crisis. Among the remaining countries, Denmark experienced the most 
modest Great Moderation, likely because of spillover effects from the neighboring countries hit 
hardest by the Scandinavian crisis. Second, output growth volatility in most countries peaked 
around World War I. The lowest levels in output volatility are reached following the Great 
Moderation for every country except Sweden.  Third, except for Canada, each country's 
inflation volatility reaches its lowest level in the 1990s or 2000s, and most peaked shortly after 
                                                           
25 For example, Australia and Sweden opted for a fixed exchange rate system after 1945. Italy, Denmark, and Finland pegged their 
currencies directly to the US dollar as well. This was not always the case. For example, after a couple of costly currency devaluations 
immediately following World War II, Canada opted for a floating exchange rate system in 1950. 22 
 
World War I, with the exception of Italy, which experienced a post-World War II hyperinflation, 
and Australia which peaked in 1952. 
The Classical Gold Standard typically yields the lowest volatilities for output growth 
and inflation in the period before 1945. For countries with long enough time series to allow us 
to estimate standard errors over a period encompassing the Classical Gold Standard, we find 
that volatilities fall at the beginning of the Classical Gold Standard period and rise near the end 
of that period. 26
The Classical Gold Standard may serve as a natural experiment to test a fixed exchange 
rate system’s ability to stabilize economic fluctuations. We also observe that the most dramatic 
declines in postwar output growth and inflation volatilities occur during the Postwar 
Moderation, which coincides with the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime. The timing of these 
two periods of reduced volatility suggests that a fixed exchange rate system is conducive to 
economic stability.
 Inflation volatility for each country is lower during the Classical Gold Standard 
period than it will be for a long time afterwards.  
27
Our estimates show that fixed exchange rate systems are associated with some of the 
largest reductions in volatility. However, a fixed exchange rate system is not necessary to 
achieve low volatilities. Standard errors of output growth and inflation over the last 20 years 
have been at or near historic lows, a time without any world-wide fixed exchange rate regime.
 
28
                                                           
26 The United Kingdom and Denmark are the only countries in this paper with volatility estimates extending back to a period before 
the Classical Gold Standard. For both countries, output volatility is lower during the Classical Gold Standard period compared with 
the years before or for a long time afterwards. In contrast, using the long series found in Mitchell (2003b), Keating and Valcarcel 
(2012) find that US output growth volatility trends upward during the Classical Gold Standard period. One possible explanation for 
this positive trend in output growth volatility is that the US may have become particularly adept at taking advantage of innovations 
that came about during that period when the US was becoming the world’s largest economy. If creative destruction happened on a 
larger scale in the US compared with most other countries, then a rise in US output growth volatility may be associated with a 
period of rapid technological change. This conjecture suggests a potentially interesting line of future research.  
 
27 A lengthy literature that investigates whether a fixed exchange rate system is stabilizing, relative to flexible rates, has developed 
over the years. In general, fixed exchange rates may stabilize fluctuations in output growth and inflation depending on certain 
conditions that pertain to the variances of structural shocks and the values of structural parameters. 
28 However, during much of the Great Moderation period, exchange rates were not fully flexible for some of these countries. 
Starting in 1979, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden, and the UK tied their currencies together with other European Union members 
through the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (EERM). In 1992, after a speculative attack on the British Pound, the UK exited the 23 
 
Inflation volatility usually reaches its highest post-World War II level in the 1970s or 
early 1980s. In some cases, it greatly exceeds levels witnessed before that war. Output growth 
volatility also rises somewhat around that period. Thus, a sizable part of the Great Moderation 
constitutes a return to volatility levels achieved during the Postwar Moderation—a reclamation 
of stability gains surrendered during the 1970s. This response is particularly pronounced for the 
US, the UK, Italy, and Canada. One likely explanation for the rise in volatilities during the 1970s 
is that the variance of oil supply shocks was higher. Another possible explanation could be that 
monetary policy was not functioning properly. Specifically, central banks may not have obeyed 
the Taylor Principle. Such behavior often yields an indeterminate equilibrium in theoretical 
models.29
Both volatilities increase at the end of the sample for every country except Australia.  
 Greater uncertainty and rising volatilities would be a natural outcome of 
indeterminacy. 
In nearly all cases, volatilities rise to levels not seen since the 1980s and sometimes even earlier.  
This evidence suggests the Great Moderation has ended for nearly all the countries in our 
sample.30
We also find that permanent shocks to output account for nearly all of the fluctuations in 
the volatility of output growth, while shocks that have only a temporary effect on output 
account for most of the fluctuations in the volatility of inflation. The structural interpretation of 
 Furthermore, recent volatilities now exceed lows reached during the Postwar 
Moderation for the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Canada. This evidence suggests that 
most of the countries in our sample may be in jeopardy of losing some of the gains made during 
the Postwar Moderation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
EERM, with Italy following shortly after. In July 1993, the remaining EERM countries agreed to deviations from exchange rate 
targets up to 15%—a move closer to a fully floating exchange rate regime. 
29 See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) on this point. However, Ascari and Ropele (2009) show that the determinacy region may 
shrink with steady state inflation. They argue that indeterminacy may still have obtained during the Volker-Greenspan period even 
if the policy rule satisfied the Taylor Principle. 
30 Using different methods, others have questioned whether the Great Moderation is over. See Clark (2009) for examples. 24 
 
the BQ model suggests that fluctuations in output growth volatility are primarily attributable to 
aggregate supply and that fluctuations in inflation volatility are largely due to aggregate 
demand.31 Of course, one may doubt that interpretation given that there are a number of 
different economic models for which aggregate demand may have a permanent effect on 
output. 32 But even if the BQ decomposition fails to provide an accurate description of the 
economic structure, it still serves as a statistical model that provides an interesting empirical 
regularity—permanent output shocks are the primary source of changes in output growth 
volatility. This finding might be used to evaluate different economic theories.33
Our study has established evidence of substantial movements in volatility of output 
growth and inflation. Frequently, these movements in volatility are associated with changes in 
policy such as to a wide-spread system of fixed exchange rates, to greater emphasis on 
economic stabilization in the post-World War II period, or to a possible failure of central banks 
to follow the Taylor Principle in the 1970s and early 1980s. We also observe large movements in 
volatilities around the time of major macroeconomic shocks such as World War I, World War II, 
and the oil price shocks of the 1970s. A better understanding of the fundamental causes of major 
movements in volatility is an important step towards the ultimate goal of crafting welfare-
improving policies. 
 
   
                                                           
31 Changes in each variable’s volatility that are primarily driven by a different type of structural disturbance seem to contradict the 
“good luck” hypothesis. For “good luck” to explain our results, changes in volatilities of the two different structural shocks would 
need to be coordinated. But the different structural shocks in our model are uncorrelated. Instead, policy changes or structural 
changes induced by major events seem to be more plausible explanations, particularly since these can be observed at times when 
major changes in estimated volatilities occur. 
32 Keating (2010) shows how one may infer qualitative information about the underlying structure from impulse responses and 
variance decompositions for permanent and transitory shocks even if demand shocks permanently affect the level of output. 
33 The use of DSGE models to discriminate between different economic theories on the basis of the factors that influence volatility is 
a potentially useful research area. This framework could be used to quantify how much of the volatility of each variable is 
attributable to different types of structural shocks. To be consistent with our results, shocks that cause permanent movements in 
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TABLE 1: Data Sources 
  Current Output  Real Output or Deflator 
United 
States 
GNP 1869-1929 (USD) 
Source: Romer (1989) 
 
GNP 1929-2009 (USD) 
Source: NIPA 
GNP 1869-1929 (1982 USD) 
 Source: Romer (1989) 
 




GDP 1830-1960 (GBP) 




GDP 1960-2009 (GBP) 
Source: WDI 
GDP 1830-1912 (1900 GBP) 
GDP 1912-1948 (1938 GBP) 
GDP 1948-1960 (1958 GBP) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (2000 GBP) 
Source: WDI 
Sweden 
GDP 1861-1960 (SEK) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (SEK) 
Source: WDI 
GDP 1861-1950 (1908 SEK) 
GDP 1950-1960 (1970 SEK) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (chain-weighted 2000 SEK) 
Source: WDI 
Italy 
GNP 1861-1960 (Lira) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (Euro) 
Source: WDI 
GNP 1861-1951 (1938 Lira) 
GNP 1951-1960 (1963 Lira) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (chain-weighted 2000 Euro) 
Source: WDI 
Finland 
GDP 1860-1960 (Markaa) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (Euro) 
Source: WDI 
GDP 1860-1960 (1985 Markaa) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (2000 Euro) 
Source: WDI 
Denmark 
GDP 1818-1960 (DKK) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (DKK) 
Source: WDI 
GDP 1818-1960 (1929 DKK) 
Source: Mitchell (2003a) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (2000 DKK) 
Source: WDI 
Canada 
GDP 1870-1960 (CAD) 
Source: Urquhart (1988) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (CAD) 
Source: WDI 
PGDP 1870-1960 (1981 GDP deflator) 
Source: Urquhart (1988) 
 
GDP 1960-2009 (2000 CAD) 
Source: WDI 
Australia 
GDP 1861-1965 (AUD) 
Source: Maddock &McLean (1987) 
 
GDP 1965-2009 (AUD) 
Source: WDI 
GDP 1861-1965 (1911 AUD) 
Source: Maddock &McLean (1987) 
 
GDP 1965-2009 (chain-weighted 2007 AUD) 
Source: WDI 
Sources:   WDI refers to World Development Indicator issue by the World Bank.  
  NIPA refers to National Income and Product Accounts issued by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 




TABLE 2: Posterior Standard Deviation Estimates 
    Postwar Moderation: 1947 - 1965  Great Moderation: 1983 - 1995  Full Sample 






0.0672  0.0272  59.4%  0.0249  0.0158  36.4% 
0.0819            0.0150 
 1933                1997 
Inflation  0.0617  0.0122  80.2%  0.0211  0.0072  65.5% 
0.1218            0.0070 






0.0375  0.0162  56.8%  0.0191  0.0135  29.3% 
0.0629            0.0123 
 1920                1998 
Inflation  0.0616  0.0194  68.4%  0.0291  0.0134  53.8% 
0.1207            0.0134 





0.0222  0.0185  16.5%  0.0171  0.0224  -31.0% 
0.0543            0.0165 
 1918               1958 
Inflation  0.0449  0.0229  48.8%  0.0340  0.0359  -5.7% 
0.1923            0.0187 





0.1941  0.0301  84.5%  0.0231  0.0157  32.0% 
0.1941            0.0117 
 1947               1999 
Inflation  0.3147  0.0355  88.7%  0.0457  0.0327  28.4% 
0.4158            0.0118 





0.0562  0.0278  50.5%  0.0192  0.0280  -46.1% 
0.1002            0.0186 
 1918                1986 
Inflation  0.2090  0.0505  75.8%  0.0282  0.0301  -6.5% 
0.2421            0.0217 





0.0638  0.0325  49.1%  0.0226  0.0192  14.9% 
0.0713            0.0168 
 1941                1999 
Inflation  0.0726  0.0354  51.2%  0.0267  0.0223  16.2% 
0.1782            0.0188 





0.0486  0.0244  49.7%  0.0250  0.0199  20.4% 
0.1144            0.0195 
 1905                1997 
Inflation  0.0600  0.0135  77.4%  0.0237  0.0140  40.7% 
0.1574             0.0126 





0.0529  0.0249  52.8%  0.0207  0.0152  26.6% 
0.0720            0.0119 
 1916               2006 
Inflation  0.0611  0.0398  34.8%  0.0334  0.0219  34.2% 
0.0850            0.0157 
1952                 2009 


































Figure 1: United States Time-Varying Standard Deviations: 1902-2009 

































Figure 3: Sweden Time-Varying Standard Deviations: 1894-2009 




























Figure 5: Finland Time-Varying Standard Deviations: 1893-2009 






























Figure 7: Canada Time-Varying Standard Deviations: 1903-2009 






   
 
 
   
 
 
































































































































Figure 9: Conditional Time-Varying Standard Deviations of Output Growth 
Figure 9A: United Sates Real GNP Growth: 1902-2009  Figure 9B: United Kingdom Real GDP Growth: 1863-2009 
Figure 9C: Sweden Real GDP Growth: 1894-2009  Figure 9D: Italy Real GNP Growth: 1894-2009 
Figure 9E: Finland Real GDP Growth: 1893-2009  Figure 9F: Denmark Real GDP Growth: 1851-2009 






   
 
 
   
 
 




















































































































Figure 10A: United States Inflation: 1902-2009 
Figure 10: Conditional Time-Varying Standard Deviations of Inflation 
Figure 10B: United Kingdom Inflation: 1863-2009 
Figure 10C: Sweden Inflation: 1894-2009  Figure 10D: Italy Inflation: 1894-2009 
Figure 10E: Finland Inflation: 1893-2009  Figure 10F: Denmark Inflation: 1851-2009 






   
   




U.S. Real GNP Growth: 1871-2009










Figure 1: UK Log Real GDP growth: 1831-2009





Figure 2: UK Inflation rate: 1831-2009




Figure 1: SWE Log Real GDP growth: 1862-2009




Figure 2: SWE Inflation rate: 1862-2009





Figure 1: ITA Real GDP growth: 1862-2009




Figure 2: ITA Inflation rate: 1862-2009
Figure A1: United States Real GNP Growth: 1871-2009 
Figure A2: United States Inflation Rate: 1871-2009 
Figure A3: United Kingdom Real GDP Growth: 1831-2009 
Figure A4: United Kingdom Inflation Rate: 1831-2009 
Figure A5: Sweden Real GDP Growth: 1862-2009 
Figure A6: Sweden Inflation Rate: 1862-2009 
Figure A7: Italy Real GNP Growth: 1862-2009 
Figure A8: Italy Inflation Rate: 1862-2009 
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Figure 1: FIN Log Real GDP growth: 1861-2009





Figure 2: FIN Inflation rate: 1861-2009




Figure 1: DEN Real GDP growth: 1819-2009




Figure 2: DEN Inflation rate: 1819-2009






Figure 1: CAN Real GDP growth: 1871-2009





Figure 2: CAN Inflation rate: 1871-2009




Figure 1: AUS Real GDP growth: 1862-2009





Figure 2: AUS Inflation rate: 1862-2009
Figure A9: Finland Real GDP Growth: 1861-2009 
Figure A10: Finland Inflation Rate: 1861-2009 
Figure A11: Denmark Real GDP Growth: 1819-2009 
Figure A12: Denmark Inflation Rate: 1819-2009 
Figure A14: Canada Inflation Rate: 1871-2009  Figure A16: Australia Inflation Rate: 1862-2009 
Figure A13: Canada Real GDP Growth: 1871-2009  Figure A15: Australia Real GDP Growth: 1862-2009 